By 1974 the US was without an embassy in Uganda. The embassy had shut the previous year after a prolonged period of difficulties with the Amin regime.
An East African Community had been established in 1967.
The Community was less than a decade old and there were serious strains within the group.
That there were tensions shouldn’t be surprising. When you get three states together and try to agree on common action, there will always be differing views. Each state – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania – each had their own particular institutions, economies and interests.
But there were fears that the whole enterprise could fall apart.
US Ambassador in Tanzania, William Beverly Carter Jr., wrote “in recent years, developments within the East African Community have been away from central control and in direction of national sovereignty.”1
Carter’s first major African posting was in Nairobi, Kenya, where he served as a Public Affairs Officer.
As US Ambassador to Tanzania, he served in Dar es Salaam from 1972 to 1975.
He later recalled that he had regarded Nyerere as one of the African political figures he particularly admired.
The East African Community was a grand project, but there were many fault lines to navigate.
Maintaining a common currency had proved too difficult.
Discussions on airlines, habours and railways took up much of the discussion at the EAC in 1974.
It appears that Kenyan and Tanzanian telecommunications staff were reluctant to work in Uganda due to safety concerns.
East African Airways was under financial strain.
Carter wrote that railways were “facing a veritable crisis situation.”2
The embassy’s sources were senior staff in rail services, harbours etc.
Let us consider rail.
Whenever you bring together 3 different rail systems to function as one, there will be negotiations over how each state will utilise resources and how much they should be expected to contribute.
Railway cars became an issue. Kenya got around 5000 while the other two states received around 4000.
By March 1974, northern Tanzania was no longer receiving fuel from the refinery in Mombasa (Kenya).
Carter noted that it took over a month for a freight car to travel from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma and back. Kigoma is located on the other side of the country, on the eastern side of lake Tanganyika.
Goods were moved along the Central Line, a metre-gauge that spanned around 1,250 kilometres. There was only line which was was used for freight going both directions. Naturally, this made transportation more difficult and inefficient.
It seems that the Tanzanians hesitated in sending railcars back to Kenya as they were not confident they would see them any time soon.
There were even concerns that some Kenyans within the EARC had connections with truck companies. Conclusive evidence doesn’t exist in the cable, but that was the rumour.
If that was the case, delays by rail would benefit trucking companies. It would also deprive the railways of income.
There was concern that Tanzania was thinking about altering its gauge in order to join with states in Southern Africa. But it wasn’t as simple as just changing the width of the gauge. It would require different coupling and brake systems as well.
Things could become parochial. The Kenyans were upset about Tanzanian coffee being exported out of the port of Tanga.
Both ports lay relatively close to the Kenya-Tanzania border. From a pure geographical point of view, it made sense for coffee produced in Uganda and Kenya to be funneled through Mombasa. It also made some sense for Tanzanian coffee to be moved through Tanga – especially if it came from the south of Tanzania.
Mombasa did not have exclusive rights within the EAC. But coffee from northern Tanzania had traditionally made its way to Mombasa. The ‘diversion’ was noted in Kenya and was viewed by the Kenyans as being against the spirit of the EAC project.
The EAC was experiencing challenges. Some were also considering what a break up would entail. In general terms, it would require assets and debts to be distributed amongst member states. That in itself would have sparked a battle royale.
By 1974, Amin’s relations with the US and Israel had soured. Amin’s regime was now welcoming Soviet and Libyan military assistance.
In March the local press was talking about military equipment that had been sourced from the Soviets, including 6 to 9 MIG-17 fighter planes.3
MIGs had also come from Gaddhafi.
Even by 1974, relations between Uganda and Tanzania had gone south.
Amin was alleging that his neighbour was planning an invasion, and of planning to reinstall former president Obote.4
When Obote was overthrown in January 1971, Nyerere had given him asylum in Tanzania and allowed him to establish himself there. Nyerere did not recognise Amin’s government as legitimate and continued to regard Obote as Uganda’s lawful president.
Obote was apparently prominent in the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of TANU.
Amin hated the coziness of the relationship between Nyerere and Obote. Of course Amin believed that he himself was the legitimate president and that Obote no longer occupied that position. Amin conducted his affairs through the exercise of power – particularly military power. How could Obote be the real president of Uganda when he sitting in exile in another country, without access to the trappings of office and without effective command of the Ugandan military?
Still, Amin’s legitimacy was never conceded by Nyerere.
Ambassador Carter wrote “Obote has wife and children and now wishes to lead a normal life.”5 Subsequent events don’t seem to support this. Following the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda, Obote did again become president of Uganda.
Loose ends were being tied up from the closure of the US embassy. Property of embassy staff (Keeley and Burrows) had been auctioned off after the closure.
Keeley was interested in the whereabouts of a particular typewriter and a set of gold clubs.6
Keeley received proceeds of from the sale of the typewriter and the clubs made their way back to the FRG embassy.
In the latter half of the year, Amin had set up an Investigative Commission to look into disappearances and murders that had taken place since his assumption of power.
Rumours abounded.
The issue was being reported in the international press.
There was mounting pressure and Amin was facing international ostracism.
Amin had an image problem.
Chairman of the Commission, Justice Mohamed Saied, held British citizenship and was Asian. This was seen to be significant given Amin’s recent expulsion of Uganda’s Asian population.
Other Commission members came from the police force and the army.
The Commission was not allowed to explore matters that touched on state security.
Hillenbrand had come to the conclusion that the commission was “not simply a propaganda maneuver but rather a genuine attempt to improve internal security.”7 This may have been a rather generous assessment of the Commission.
By 1974, we were already some years into the Amin regime. The tone of his presidency had already been established. Relations with Israel and the US had broken down.
Amin had become considerably closer to the USSR and Libya.
The regime had a reputation for murder and disappearances.
Amin’s relationship with Tanzania was increasingly strained, not helped by Obote residing there and Obote’s good relationship with Nyerere.
There was an ambassadorial power vacuum given that the US no longer had a presence in Uganda.
Whether the US should reopen their post was a topic of regular conversation amongst the diplomatic corps.
Amin sometimes tried to praise for the Americans. But it was never sustained and it was usually followed by condemnation.
The Americans were no in no rush to reestablish their mission in Uganda.
- William Beverley Carter Jr., “East African Community: Problems and Prospects as seen from Dar es Salaam, Canonical ID 1974DARES00777_b, 11 March 1974 ↩︎
- Ibid ↩︎
- Hillenbrand, “Substantive Reporting on Uganda: Uganda’s Relations with the Soviet Union”, Canonical ID 1974BONN4273_b, 18 March 1974 ↩︎
- Carter, “New Problem in Tanzania-Uganda Relations”, Canonical ID 1974DARES02360_b, 15 July 1974 ↩︎
- Carter, “Tanzania-Uganda Relations”, Canonical ID 1974DARES02405_b, 17 July 1974 ↩︎
- Hillenbrand, “US Interests in Uganda – Auctioned Property of Keeley and Burrows, Canonical ID 1974STATE170710_b, 6 August 1974 ↩︎
- Hillenbrand, “Substantive Reporting on Uganda: Domestic Political Situation, Canonical ID 1974BONN12783_b, 13 August 1974 ↩︎
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